At Rome’s Angelicum, Orthodox and Anglican scholars joined Vatican cardinals to consider the future of ecclesiastical law. Cardinal Kurt Koch proposed an eventual ecumenical juridical order, while Cardinal Mario Grech connected the discussion to the Synodal Assembly of 2028. Behind the language of consultation lies a question which cannot be settled by administrative reform: can the laws of the Catholic Church be reshaped according to ecclesiologies which do not recognise her understanding of divine authority?
Cardinal Kurt Koch believes that the restoration of Christian communion will require a “new juridical order”. Speaking at Rome’s Angelicum on 30 September, the Prefect of the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity anticipated a movement “from a Catholic canon law on ecumenism to an ecumenical canon law”. These words deserve considerably more attention than the customary photographs of smiling participants and enthusiastic accounts of fruitful ecumenical exchanges. They were spoken by the cardinal responsible for the Holy See’s ecumenical relations, at a conference specifically organised to explore how the canonical practices of other Christian traditions might inform the future government of the Catholic Church.¹
The conference, From Listening to Practice, took place from 30 September to 3 October 2026 at the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas. Organised by the Angelicum’s Œcumenicum and Faculty of Canon Law, it examined synodal institutions, ecclesiastical decision-making and the juridical arrangements of several Christian traditions. One session brought together Metropolitan Job (Getcha) of Pisidia, representing the Orthodox tradition of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Reverend Professor Russell Dewhurst of Cardiff University, offering an Anglican perspective. Their subject was The Role of Canon Law in a Synodal Church in an Ecumenical Perspective. The programme culminated in proposals for the possible renewal of Catholic canon law in the light of the Synod on Synodality.²
There is nothing objectionable about Catholic canonists studying the legal traditions of other Christian bodies. Serious ecumenical scholarship requires an accurate understanding of how separated Christians govern themselves, exercise authority and maintain their common life. Metropolitan Job brings experience of the Orthodox canonical tradition and its long engagement with questions of episcopal primacy. Dewhurst has published substantial scholarship on the constitutional arrangements of the Anglican Communion. Both perspectives have something to contribute. The difficulty begins when comparative study becomes a source of proposals for reforming Catholic government, particularly where the systems being examined proceed from understandings of ecclesiastical authority which Catholic doctrine cannot simply adopt.
Koch’s intervention brought that difficulty into focus. Recalling the work of the Dominican theologian Yves Congar, he suggested that Christian communions recognised as possessing an authentic ecclesial character should receive corresponding recognition within a future juridical settlement. Congar had envisaged the development of a body of ecumenical law grounded in the sacramental nature of the Church and the relationships established by Baptism. Koch presented the idea as a possible consequence of restored communion, not as legislation already proposed for enactment. Nevertheless, the ambition extends beyond regulating relations between presently separated Christians. It concerns the legal constitution of a communion which does not yet exist.¹
The distinction is important because juridical recognition may mean several different things. The Catholic Church already acknowledges the validity of Baptism administered in numerous separated communities, recognises the sacraments and apostolic succession of the Eastern Orthodox Churches, and makes canonical provision for particular circumstances involving Christians outside full communion. Such recognition accurately describes relationships which already exist. A juridical settlement governing restored ecclesiastical communion would require something further: agreement about the faith, sacramental life and authority which make that communion possible. The law could give such unity its appropriate institutional expression. It could not create doctrinal agreement by assigning the parties places within a common constitutional arrangement.
There is, moreover, an important qualification to Koch’s appeal to John Paul II which deserves careful examination. In his address, Koch suggested that the validity of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches would cease with the restoration of full communion between Catholics and the separated Eastern Churches. Yet John Paul II’s apostolic constitution Sacri Canones, promulgating that Code in 1990, was more precise. The Pope affirmed that the Eastern Code possessed the same juridical force as the Latin Code and would remain in force until abrogated or modified by the supreme authority of the Church for just reasons. The restoration of full Eastern communion was identified as an exceptionally grave reason for such revision. It was not presented as a condition automatically extinguishing the existing legislation.³
The difference matters. John Paul II plainly understood that reconciliation with the Orthodox would require substantial canonical accommodation. The Catholic Church could hardly demand that reunited Eastern patriarchates simply discard their ancient discipline in favour of every administrative practice developed by the Latin Church. But the authority to revise ecclesiastical law remains vested in the competent authorities of the Church. The prospect of reunion supplies a compelling reason to consider reform; it does not make the Church’s constitutional identity dependent upon the arrangements eventually negotiated. Indeed, Sacri Canones explicitly preserves both the legitimate diversity of the Eastern Churches and their communion with the Roman Pontiff.
This is where the Orthodox contribution is especially valuable. The Eastern Orthodox Churches possess a sacramental and episcopal inheritance which cannot be equated with the constitutional arrangements of Protestant denominations. Their synodal government reflects the ancient organisation of patriarchates, metropolitan provinces and episcopal councils. The Catholic–Orthodox theological commissions have explored these traditions through the Ravenna, Chieti and Alexandria documents, establishing considerable historical common ground while acknowledging serious disagreements concerning Roman primacy.⁴ Those disagreements are precisely what an eventual restoration of communion must resolve.
The Catholic doctrine defined by Pastor Aeternus does not require the defence of every administrative centralisation undertaken by Rome. Papal primacy is not synonymous with papal maximalism. Catholic Tradition has always admitted proper episcopal jurisdiction, legitimate particular law and considerable differences between Eastern and Western ecclesiastical discipline. The Eastern Catholic Churches themselves demonstrate that communion with the Roman See need not entail uniformity of government. But Vatican I did define the Roman Pontiff’s supreme, full, immediate and universal jurisdiction as belonging to the divine constitution of the Church. That jurisdiction cannot be treated as a courtesy accorded by autonomous Churches, or as a competence which exists only when other ecclesiastical authorities consent to its exercise.⁵
Orthodox synodality therefore offers Catholic scholars an opportunity to reconsider the historical exercise of authority without surrendering its doctrinal foundation. Much might be recovered from the ancient practice of episcopal councils and patriarchal administration. The decisive question is whether such recovery takes place within the Catholic understanding of primacy or requires that understanding to be altered. The distinction is frequently obscured by appeals to the practices of the first millennium, as though historical evidence of substantial local autonomy automatically settles the theological question of universal jurisdiction. It does not. The very documents produced by Catholic–Orthodox dialogue demonstrate that the interpretation of Roman primacy remains an unresolved difficulty.
The Anglican example illustrates another problem, and Dewhurst’s own scholarship is particularly instructive. Writing in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal in May 2025, he examined the four principal instruments of communion within Anglicanism: the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lambeth Conference, the Primates’ Meeting and the Anglican Consultative Council. None possesses inherent universal jurisdiction over the autonomous churches comprising the Anglican Communion. Their authority depends substantially upon persuasion, consultation and the willingness of individual provinces to receive common decisions.⁶
These arrangements reflect an ecclesiology fundamentally different from that of Catholicism. An Anglican province is not subject to the Archbishop of Canterbury in the manner in which a Catholic particular Church is subject to the supreme jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff. The institutions of the Anglican Communion can facilitate common deliberation, but their capacity to enforce doctrinal agreement is limited. The consequences have been visible in disputes concerning ministry, sexuality, episcopal oversight and the recognition of decisions taken by individual provinces. Common institutions have continued to exist while serious disagreements have threatened the cohesion of the Communion.
The point is not that Anglican constitutional experience has nothing to teach Catholic canonists. On the contrary, it provides a valuable demonstration of what happens when common institutions lack the jurisdiction necessary to settle disputes authoritatively. Such a system may work tolerably well where agreement already exists. When disagreements concern matters regarded by the parties as fundamental to Christian faith and order, the absence of binding universal authority becomes considerably more consequential. Before treating Anglican structures as resources for Catholic reform, it would be useful to establish which features of their operation represent strengths to be adopted and which reveal weaknesses that Catholic constitutional principles were designed to avoid.
Nor should the historical contrast be concealed beneath a vocabulary which makes every ecclesiastical arrangement appear to be another manifestation of the same principle. Synodality in an Orthodox episcopal synod, consultation within an Anglican province and deliberation in a Catholic diocesan pastoral council do not possess identical theological or juridical meanings. Their members participate in different capacities; their conclusions carry different authority; and the constitutional relationships between those who deliberate and those who govern differ accordingly. To place these institutions side by side is illuminating. To presume their underlying ecclesiologies compatible requires a demonstration which comparative description alone cannot provide.
Cardinal Mario Grech’s keynote address made clear why these distinctions have immediate practical significance. The Secretary General of the Synod identified the Angelicum conference as a contribution to preparations for the Ecclesial Assembly of 2028. He considered how ecclesiastical law might better express synodality, how consultative bodies should influence decisions, how representation functions within ecclesiastical institutions, and whether members of other Christian communities might participate regularly in Catholic synodal bodies. He explicitly acknowledged that the Catholic Church remains constitutively hierarchical and identified the Petrine ministry as an essential element of Catholic synodality. That affirmation must be taken seriously. It also establishes a standard against which the reforms under consideration should be judged.⁷
Grech suggested that existing canonical provisions already permit fraternal delegates from other Christian traditions to participate in certain consultative settings. A diocesan pastoral council, for example, might invite representatives of other Christian communities to discuss matters of common concern. No difficulty necessarily arises from such arrangements. Catholic bishops have long consulted non-Catholic Christians and cooperated with them on questions of religious liberty, charitable activity, social welfare and public morality. The more demanding question concerns the purpose and competence of the institution concerned. An invited observer contributing information or counsel occupies a very different position from a participant whose judgement is intended to influence the ordinary government or discipline of the Catholic Church.
The distinction becomes sharper when consultation itself acquires juridical consequences. Grech recalled the Synod’s insistence that ordained ministers should not depart from consultative conclusions producing agreement without compelling reasons. A bishop who invites counsel ought not to ignore it arbitrarily. The Church’s canonical tradition has always recognised the value of consultation and, in specified circumstances, the necessity of obtaining consent. But counsel and consent have different legal effects. If a bishop must demonstrate that his reasons for rejecting a recommendation are sufficiently compelling, the question immediately arises as to who possesses authority to make that determination. A procedure intended to improve episcopal government could, if carelessly drafted, compromise the responsibility of the bishop who remains answerable for the decision.
The timing of the conference makes these questions more than academic. On 29 September, the General Secretariat of the Synod published the Final Report of its Canonical Commission. The report proposed amendments concerning lay participation in ecclesiastical governance, particular councils, episcopal conferences and consultative bodies. Although presented as a working document rather than legislation, it envisaged more extensive reform in the longer term, including the possibility of a comprehensive revision of both the Latin and Eastern Codes.⁸ The Angelicum conference was a distinct exercise, but it took place within the same developing programme of institutional reflection.
Nuntiatoria examined this progression in Vatican III by Stealth? When “Reception” Becomes Revision, which considered Archbishop Anthony Randazzo’s warning against interpretations of synodality which would treat inherited ecclesiastical structures as expendable.⁹ The subsequent investigation, Synodality’s Next Step: Writing the Revolution into Canon Law, examined the actual proposals of the Canonical Commission, including obligatory participatory bodies, expanded requirements for consent, and wider responsibilities for lay Catholics in ecclesiastical governance.¹⁰ More recently, Synodality Cannot Substitute for Good Bishops considered Cardinal José Cobo’s insistence that papal authority remains intact while further canonical reform becomes increasingly urgent.¹¹ The common difficulty running through these developments is that a method of consultation, initially commended as a pastoral disposition, is gradually acquiring the character of an obligatory juridical system.
The Angelicum conference adds an ecumenical dimension to that concern. Catholic reformers are examining models of governance drawn from Christian communities whose constitutional assumptions differ considerably from their own. There is no evidence that any particular Anglican or Orthodox proposal has been adopted, nor does Koch’s address establish that existing Catholic doctrine concerning primacy is being formally reconsidered. The documentary evidence nevertheless establishes an organised effort to learn from those arrangements while considering the future development of Catholic law. It is therefore entirely reasonable to ask which theological criteria will determine what may legitimately be borrowed.
A similar question arose in Nuntiatoria’s examination of the revised Charta Oecumenica, Peace Without the King, Unity Without the Church. The concern there was that ecumenical programmes might acquire considerable influence over ordinary ecclesiastical practice despite possessing neither binding doctrinal authority nor the status of formal legislation.¹² That distinction bears directly upon the present discussion. Conferences and working documents cannot change the Church’s law by themselves, but the assumptions they establish may subsequently inform legislation. By the time a particular proposal receives canonical force, its underlying ecclesiology may already have become an accepted feature of institutional thinking.
The essential theological question is therefore not whether Catholics should listen to the Orthodox or Anglicans, or whether ecclesiastical discipline may develop. Both propositions admit straightforward answers. The question concerns the authority by which such development is judged. Canon law serves the Church’s received constitution. It expresses relationships founded upon the sacraments, apostolic succession, ecclesiastical jurisdiction and communion in the Faith. Its provisions may develop because the Church encounters new circumstances, but the legitimacy of their development depends upon their fidelity to that constitution.
This is why the distinction between the divine and ecclesiastical elements of Church law must remain governing rather than incidental. A different method of selecting bishops may be legitimate. So may a broader restoration of patriarchal authority, revised procedures for diocesan consultation, or new arrangements acknowledging the authentic disciplinary traditions of reunited Eastern Churches. None of these developments necessarily threatens Catholic doctrine. But a proposal which altered the nature of episcopal office, made papal jurisdiction dependent upon conciliar consent, or conferred the rights of full ecclesiastical communion without its doctrinal obligations would raise an altogether different question. Administrative convenience, historical precedent and ecumenical desirability cannot establish the legitimacy of what contradicts a divine institution.
There is an additional danger in imagining that the difficulties of Christian division may be overcome principally through constitutional ingenuity. Pope Pius XI addressed the underlying error in Mortalium Animos, rejecting the conception of unity as an arrangement by which communities professing contradictory doctrines could retain their differences within a common religious association. His encyclical belonged to a particular historical controversy, and its warnings should not be carelessly applied to every contemporary ecumenical initiative. Its governing principle remains pertinent: Christian unity must be founded upon revealed truth rather than upon an institutional settlement designed to accommodate unresolved disagreement.¹³
Indeed, Koch’s proposal would acquire considerably greater theological credibility if its advocates explained more precisely the relationship between the necessary doctrinal reconciliation and the juridical arrangements intended to follow it. Restored Eastern communion would undoubtedly require laws respecting the legitimate authority of patriarchs and synods. Western communities entering full Catholic communion might likewise retain compatible elements of their liturgical, spiritual and disciplinary inheritance. The Ordinariates established for former Anglicans already provide a limited example of distinctive ecclesiastical arrangements existing within Catholic communion. Such precedents demonstrate the flexibility of ecclesiastical law without requiring the abandonment of Catholic ecclesiology.
What requires explanation is the extent to which Koch envisages a genuinely new juridical order rather than the legitimate extension and adaptation of principles already present in Catholic law. If the proposed settlement is to respect the divine constitution of the Church, its novelty must concern the juridical arrangements by which communion is expressed, not the nature of communion itself. That distinction should be articulated before further discussion proceeds, particularly when Cardinal Grech is simultaneously encouraging reflection upon new institutional relationships between primacy, collegiality and synodality.
There is no shortage of ecclesiastical problems requiring attention. Bishops need effective means of exercising their office, the faithful require the protection of their canonical rights, and the relationship between Rome and the particular Churches demands prudence and clarity. But the Church’s present difficulties have not arisen simply because Catholics possess insufficient opportunities to consult one another. The failures of episcopal leadership, doctrinal instruction, sacramental discipline and missionary courage cannot be repaired by altering the distribution of seats around an ecclesiastical conference table. A new juridical arrangement may correct defective procedures. It cannot compensate for a defective understanding of the Faith those procedures exist to serve.
Pope Leo XIV, himself a canon lawyer trained at the Angelicum, is well placed to appreciate the distinction. As the Synodal Assembly of 2028 approaches, proposals for canonical reform will require careful theological scrutiny, especially where ecumenical considerations are advanced as reasons for institutional change. The Church has nothing to fear from serious scholarship, including scholarship offered by those outside her visible communion. She has much to fear from imprecision about the principles governing her own authority. The first duty of those responsible for revising ecclesiastical law is to establish faithfully what that law must preserve.
Christian unity remains a duty of the highest importance. Our Lord prayed that His disciples might be one, and the wounds of division cannot be treated with indifference. Catholic engagement with the separated Eastern Churches, Anglicans and other Christians should therefore be serious, charitable and intellectually honest. Yet reconciliation cannot be achieved by avoiding the very questions which made separation consequential. The sacramental constitution of the Church, the authority of the episcopate, the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and the integrity of revealed doctrine are not administrative obstacles to be negotiated away. They concern the Church’s identity and the conditions of the unity for which Christians pray.
The Angelicum conference may contribute to a more exact understanding of the canonical arrangements needed for genuine reunion. Cardinal Koch’s proposed ecumenical juridical order deserves examination, and the scholarship of Metropolitan Job, Russell Dewhurst and their colleagues should be assessed on its merits. But the laws of a reunited Church cannot be settled independently of the Faith and authority which are to constitute that reunion. Rome must determine the nature of the communion being sought before it begins designing the structures intended to govern it.
The Church may learn from those with whom she is not in full communion. She cannot discover her own identity by negotiating it with them.
¹ Cardinal Kurt Koch, Greeting to the International Ecumenical Symposium “From Listening to Practice”, Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, 30 September 2026; citing Yves Congar, Autonomie et pouvoir central dans l’Église vus par la théologie catholique, Irénikon, vol. 53 (1980), pp. 291–313, and R. Sohm nous interroge encore, Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, vol. 57 (1973), pp. 262–294.
² Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas, Œcumenicum, From Listening to Practice: Ecumenical Conference on Canonical Practices of Synodality, official conference programme, Rome, 30 September–3 October 2026; Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, Cardinal Koch Opens Conference “From Listening to Practice”, 9 October 2026.
³ Pope John Paul II, Sacri Canones, Apostolic Constitution promulgating the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, 18 October 1990, especially the provision beginning Ex quo fit, ut canones Codicis Ecclesiarum orientalium catholicarum eandem firmitatem…
⁴ Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church, Synodality and Primacy During the First Millennium, Chieti, 2016; Synodality and Primacy in the Second Millennium and Today, Alexandria, 2023.
⁵ First Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ, 18 July 1870, chapters III–IV; Code of Canon Law, 1983, canons 331–333.
⁶ Russell Dewhurst, Synodality at the Universal Level in the Anglican Communion, Ecclesiastical Law Journal, vol. 27, no. 2, May 2025, pp. 170–179.
⁷ Cardinal Mario Grech, The Role of Canon Law in a Synodal Church in an Ecumenical Perspective, keynote address, Angelicum, Rome, 30 September 2026.
⁸ General Secretariat of the Synod, Proposed Amendments to Canons Concerning Ecclesial Governance, Participation of the Faithful and Accountability, publication of the Canonical Commission’s Final Report, 29 September 2026.
⁹ Nuntiatoria, Vatican III by Stealth? When “Reception” Becomes Revision, 30 September 2026.
¹⁰ Nuntiatoria, Synodality’s Next Step: Writing the Revolution into Canon Law, 1 October 2026.
¹¹ Nuntiatoria, Synodality Cannot Substitute for Good Bishops, 19 October 2026.
¹² Nuntiatoria, Peace Without the King, Unity Without the Church, 14 September 2026.
¹³ Pope Pius XI, Mortalium Animos, Encyclical on Religious Unity, 6 January 1928, especially §§6–12.
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