Cardinal Robert McElroy has told Catholics in Washington to “fight every dimension” of what he described as the Trump administration’s war upon immigrants and to convert political representatives who tolerate it “or replace them”. His defence of the dignity of migrants belongs unquestionably within Catholic moral teaching. His electoral conclusion requires a further argument. Nuntiatoria has consistently maintained that Catholic immigration doctrine holds charity, political order, the common good and prudence together. McElroy’s homily demonstrates what happens when one part of that synthesis threatens to consume the rest.

Cardinal Robert McElroy chose the World Day of Migrants and Refugees to make one of the most explicitly political interventions of his episcopate. Preaching at the Cathedral of St Matthew the Apostle in Washington on Sunday, 27 September, the Cardinal invoked Deuteronomy, the Good Samaritan and Emma Lazarus’s words upon the Statue of Liberty before turning directly to the immigration policies of the Trump administration. He accused the Government of conducting a “war on every undocumented immigrant”, described what is being done as “evil”, told Catholics that they must “fight every dimension of it”, and concluded that they must seek to “convert our political representatives from tolerating this evil or replace them”.¹

It is that final movement which changes the character of the intervention. A bishop condemning cruelty, unlawful treatment, the unjust separation of families or violations of human dignity is exercising an ordinary and necessary part of his pastoral office. A bishop telling Catholics that elected representatives associated with a disputed field of public policy should be “replaced” is doing something more. He has moved from proclaiming principles by which conscience must be formed towards prescribing an electoral consequence which he believes those principles require.

Nuntiatoria has addressed the substance of the immigration question before. Our response to McElroy cannot credibly be reduced to a defence of Donald Trump or an adoption of the American political Right. In February, in A Catholic Theology of Immigration: Charity, Order, and the Common Good, we rejected precisely the binary which treats immigration either as a “civilisational threat” or as an “unquestioned social good”.² Catholic doctrine begins elsewhere. It begins with the dignity of the human person, the natural legitimacy of political society, the order of charity, the common good and the virtue of prudence. It therefore refuses both contempt for the stranger and the sentimental abolition of political distinctions.

The migrant possesses human dignity because he is a human being created by God, not because a government has granted him legal status. That dignity survives irregular entry, unlawful residence, detention and deportation. No government acquires a moral licence to humiliate or brutalise someone because his immigration status is unlawful. Children deserve particular solicitude. Families cannot be broken apart casually. Refugees genuinely fleeing persecution possess claims in justice which must be heard. Where immigration enforcement becomes cruel, arbitrary or unjust, Catholics have no reason to defend the injustice merely because it is committed in the name of border control.

But this is only one part of Catholic teaching. The Catechism does not teach an unrestricted right to enter and remain within whatever country one chooses. It says that prosperous nations are obliged, “to the extent they are able”, to welcome foreigners seeking security and the means of livelihood which they cannot find in their countries of origin. In the same paragraph it explicitly recognises the right of political authorities to make immigration subject to juridical conditions for the sake of the common good, while reminding immigrants of their corresponding duties to respect the material and spiritual heritage of the country which receives them, obey its laws and assist in carrying civic burdens.³

This is not an awkward qualification appended to a supposedly purer doctrine of unrestricted hospitality. It belongs to the doctrine itself. Political communities are real moral communities with obligations towards those already entrusted to their care. Governments possess duties to preserve public order, protect borders, maintain social peace, administer finite resources and sustain the conditions within which families and intermediate communities can flourish. Universal charity does not abolish particular responsibility. As Nuntiatoria argued in February, Biblical hospitality presupposes structure; it does not abolish political form.²

That balance is precisely what McElroy’s rhetoric risks obscuring. There is a considerable moral distance between the proposition that Christians must love the stranger and a conclusion about precisely which persons a state must admit, on what terms, in what numbers, through which legal routes, with what enforcement mechanisms and under what circumstances those without lawful permission to remain may be removed. Scripture supplies indispensable moral principles. It does not provide an immigration statute.

The same distinction applies to the Cardinal’s use of the Good Samaritan. Christ’s parable destroys the excuse by which a Christian might refuse mercy to a suffering stranger because he is foreign, despised or inconvenient. It does not determine the annual number of asylum admissions to the United States, establish the evidential threshold for an asylum claim, settle the proper consequences of illegal entry or identify every circumstance in which deportation becomes unjust. To acknowledge that is not to weaken the Gospel. It is to refuse to treat Scripture as though it were a party manifesto.

Pope Leo XIV’s own message for the 112th World Day of Migrants and Refugees is instructive. His theme, “Even Just One of These Children”, deliberately directs attention towards migrant and refugee minors. Leo insists upon their inherent dignity, describes displaced children as particularly vulnerable, calls for action upon the causes which compel them to flee, and demands protection, family reunification and effective legal safeguards in countries of transit and destination.⁴ The papal appeal is morally serious and deserves to be heard. Yet Leo does not proceed from these principles to the assertion that one particular American immigration settlement is uniquely required by Catholic teaching, still less that Catholics must replace politicians who support another.

McElroy proceeds further. That is where the question of episcopal competence becomes exact. The problem is not that a bishop may never draw political consequences from moral evil. Bishops can and sometimes must condemn laws or policies which authorise intrinsically evil acts or manifest injustice. Catholic history would be incomprehensible without pastors confronting rulers and political systems. The real question is whether McElroy has demonstrated that the range of immigration policies which he condemns possesses sufficient moral determinacy to justify the electoral conclusion he attaches to them.

Calling something “evil” does not remove the obligation to establish what precisely is evil about it. Nor does it establish that every politician who tolerates a contested policy is morally disqualified from office. If a particular enforcement practice deliberately attacks the innocent, employs disproportionate violence, violates due process or treats children as instruments of coercion, that practice can and should be judged according to its moral species and the evidence. But the judgement must be made specifically. “Immigration enforcement” is not itself a moral species. Neither is “deportation”. Neither is “securing the border”. Catholic moral reasoning cannot replace distinctions with adjectives.

This connects directly with Nuntiatoria’s April examination of the American bishops’ intervention over birthright citizenship. In Catholic Bishops’ Empty Moralizing? Dignity, Order, and the Collapse of Proportion in Contemporary Catholic Discourse, we identified the danger of allowing a genuine Catholic principle — human dignity — to function almost as though it were self-interpreting.⁵ The problem was never that dignity was irrelevant. The problem was the assumption that invoking dignity could settle questions which also required constitutional reasoning, distinctions concerning political membership and prudential judgement.

The same methodological weakness appears here. The “dignity of the immigrant” is unquestionably a Catholic principle. It does not, by itself, tell us whether an individual deportation is unjust, whether detention is necessary in a particular case, what degree of border enforcement is proportionate, whether someone without permission to remain should be regularised, how asylum claims should be assessed or which enforcement priorities best serve the common good. Dignity begins that moral analysis. It does not finish it.

This is why the political vocation of the laity cannot be treated as an afterthought. Catholic social teaching does not imagine bishops as electoral directors and the faithful as their voting bloc. Pastors teach the moral law, identify principles, condemn intrinsic evil, defend the innocent and form consciences. Laymen and women possess their own responsibility for ordering temporal affairs according to those truths. That responsibility requires prudence precisely because political government ordinarily involves several legitimate goods, competing obligations, imperfect alternatives and foreseeable consequences which cannot simply be read from a doctrinal proposition.

Immigration provides an obvious example. Two Catholics may affirm exactly the same doctrine concerning human dignity and nevertheless disagree about border enforcement, asylum procedure, detention, deportation priorities, regularisation, refugee admissions or the distribution of finite public resources. This does not mean that every conceivable policy is morally legitimate. It means that where a policy crosses a binding moral boundary, the case must be demonstrated rather than assumed.

That is the missing step in McElroy’s electoral exhortation. If the Cardinal wishes to say that specific acts committed by the present administration are unjust, the acts can be named and assessed. If he contends that a particular policy constitutes grave moral evil rather than a disputable exercise of governmental prudence, the reasons can be established. But to move from the dignity of immigrants, through a general condemnation of the administration’s enforcement programme, to the conclusion that Catholics should “replace” politicians who tolerate it risks compressing moral principle, prudential application and electoral judgement into a single episcopal pronouncement.

Nor does recognising a prudential sphere mean retreating into moral relativism. The direct killing of innocent human beings cannot be made good by political calculation. Neither can torture, racial hatred, deliberate cruelty or intentional injustice. A bishop who identifies such an evil need not pretend that Catholics possess equal moral freedom to endorse or oppose it. But precisely because moral absolutes possess such gravity, they should not be casually extended until every disputed political application of a genuine Catholic principle is treated as though its moral character were equally self-evident.

Nuntiatoria’s recent Christianity Is Right ~ Not Right Wing approached the same problem from another direction. Catholicism is not the religious department of the contemporary political Right. It did not receive its teaching about marriage, family, authority, nation, property or the common good from conservatism. A government calling itself conservative receives no exemption from the moral law. Borders cannot sanctify cruelty. National sovereignty is not absolute. Patriotism can become idolatrous, and the foreigner never ceases to be our neighbour.⁶

But Catholicism is no more the ecclesiastical department of progressive humanitarianism. The Church did not receive her understanding of human dignity from contemporary liberalism. Charity cannot be detached from justice, order, particular obligations and the common good. Catholic doctrine has its own grammar. As When Politics Defines Doctrine argued, politics must be judged by Catholic principles rather than Catholic principles being reconstructed according to the categories of contemporary politics.⁷

That independence must operate in both directions. It would be wrong to baptise the Trump administration’s immigration programme merely because it invokes national sovereignty or border control. It is equally wrong to make opposition to that programme synonymous with fidelity to Catholic social teaching without distinguishing its various measures and examining their moral character. The Church must remain free to tell an administration when its conduct violates justice and equally free to tell the administration’s critics that borders, lawful deportation and differentiated political obligations are not in themselves sins against the Gospel.

There is another dimension which contemporary Catholic discussion of immigration too often neglects. In July, Nuntiatoria argued in Welcome Without Christ Is Not Charity that the Church increasingly risks speaking about migrants as though her vocation were exhausted by reception, legal assistance, material provision and social integration.⁸ These are genuine works of mercy. They do not exhaust Christian charity. The migrant is not merely a beneficiary of policy but a soul created for God, and the supreme gift the Church possesses for him remains Jesus Christ.

The contrast becomes uncomfortable. Ecclesiastical voices can display remarkable confidence when prescribing the political response to migration while showing considerably greater reserve about the missionary imperative. Governments are told what they must do. Particular policies are denounced. Political representatives are now to be “replaced”. Yet the explicitly supernatural purpose of the Church’s encounter with the migrant can recede into the background. When that happens, Catholic charity risks being reduced to humanitarian activism and episcopal energy redirected from evangelising temporal society towards administering its preferred policy conclusions.

McElroy’s appeal to the Statue of Liberty deserves attention for the same reason. Emma Lazarus’s famous verses legitimately belong to the American civic imagination, and Americans may reasonably regard them as expressive of an important national tradition. But the Statue of Liberty is neither Scripture nor Magisterium. To declare that America is “losing our soul as a nation” because it is abandoning both Deuteronomy and the Statue of Liberty rhetorically places divine revelation alongside a nineteenth-century expression of American civic aspiration.¹ One binds the Christian conscience as the Word of God. The other may inform an American’s understanding of his national inheritance. They do not possess the same authority.

None of this requires the pulpit to become politically mute. St John the Baptist did not regard Herod’s public wrongdoing as beyond the concern of religion. The Church would betray her mission if fear of appearing political prevented her from condemning abortion, euthanasia, persecution, racial injustice or deliberate mistreatment of the vulnerable. Christianity necessarily has public consequences because the moral law binds rulers as surely as private citizens.

The corresponding danger arises when the authority of the pulpit gives sacramental and spiritual weight to a prudential political judgement. A Catholic hearing his archbishop say during Mass that particular political representatives should be “replaced” does not hear merely another contributor to democratic discussion. He hears a successor of the Apostles preaching in the sacred liturgy. That authority demands greater precision, not less, concerning the difference between a binding Catholic moral conclusion and the bishop’s judgement about how that conclusion should be translated into electoral choice.

There was no shortage of material from which McElroy could have preached forcefully without obscuring that distinction. He could demand that every migrant be treated as a human person, condemn demonstrable cruelty, insist upon justice for children, remind enforcement officers that an unlawful migrant remains their neighbour, challenge legislators to ensure that asylum and deportation procedures conform to justice, and call Catholics to examine themselves for xenophobia or indifference. Where particular Government actions are proved unjust, he can condemn them plainly. None of this requires transforming a disputed complex of immigration policies into an episcopal voting instruction.

That is the heart of the matter. Dignity without order degenerates into sentimentalism. Order without charity hardens into injustice. Episcopal authority without prudential distinction risks clericalising the political vocation of the laity. Catholic social doctrine refuses all three errors because it holds together what modern political argument habitually tears apart.

The Catholic response to immigration is consequently neither closed-hearted nationalism nor borderless sentimentalism. It is the more demanding synthesis required by the tradition: the inviolable dignity of the human person; special care for the vulnerable; the legitimate authority of political society over its borders and laws; the obligations of migrants towards receiving societies; the duties of governments towards their own people; the common good; the order of charity; justice; mercy; and prudence.

That synthesis will not produce identical immigration programmes among Catholics of good faith. Nor should bishops pretend that it will. Their authority is strongest when they teach the principles completely, identify genuine moral boundaries exactly and form consciences capable of governing temporal affairs without attempting to substitute episcopal judgement for the prudential responsibility of the laity.

The Church must remain free enough to trouble every political tribe because she belongs to none of them. She must be able to tell the nationalist that the foreigner is his neighbour, the humanitarian that charity does not abolish order, the ruler that sovereignty remains subject to God, the migrant that hospitality brings obligations as well as rights, and the Catholic voter that political allegiance cannot replace a conscience formed by truth.

Cardinal McElroy is right that Catholics may not simply pass by suffering human beings on the other side of the road. But pastors must be equally careful not to pass by the distinction between proclaiming moral truth and prescribing a prudential electoral conclusion. Once those things are confused, the formation of conscience begins to become the direction of political choice. That does not strengthen the Church’s social doctrine. It diminishes its integrity.


  1. Archdiocese of Washington, Homily for the Mass for World Day of Migrants and Refugees Delivered by Robert Cardinal McElroy, 27 September 2026.
  2. Nuntiatoria, A Catholic Theology of Immigration: Charity, Order, and the Common Good, 21 February 2026.
  3. Holy See, Catechism of the Catholic Church, §2241.
  4. Pope Leo XIV, Message for the 112th World Day of Migrants and Refugees: “Even Just One of These Children”, 11 August 2026.
  5. Nuntiatoria, Catholic Bishops’ Empty Moralizing? Dignity, Order, and the Collapse of Proportion in Contemporary Catholic Discourse, 26 April 2026.
  6. Nuntiatoria, Christianity Is Right ~ Not Right Wing, 8 September 2026.
  7. Nuntiatoria, When Politics Defines Doctrine: Edmund Waldstein, Integralism and the New Boundary at Heiligenkreuz, 8 September 2026.
  8. Nuntiatoria, Welcome Without Christ Is Not Charity, 10 July 2026.

RELATED ARTICLES



Never miss an edition of Nuntiatoria

Serious Catholic journalism, theological analysis, liturgical commentary and the weekly Ordo, delivered directly to your inbox.

Subscribe free. If you value this independent work, you can also become a Nuntiatoria Supporter and help keep our journalism and pastoral resources freely available to everyone.

Free to read. Sustained by readers.

Leave a Reply

Trending

Live Q&A with Archbishop Jerome Lloyd: questions on faith, tradition and the spiritual life

LIVE TODAY · THURSDAY · 5PM GMT

Join ✠ Jerome Lloyd for questions on faith, tradition and the spiritual life.

WATCH LIVE ON OLD ROMAN TV

Request a Mass — for the living and the departed

NOVEMBER • MONTH OF THE HOLY SOULS

Remember your loved ones at the altar

Have a traditional Requiem Mass offered for the repose of your departed family, friends and benefactors—whether they died recently or many years ago.

Your Mass stipend also helps support the priest’s ministry and the work of the Old Roman Apostolate.

Request a Mass

Suggested stipend: £15 per Mass.

SUPPORT NUNTIATORIA

Become a supporting subscriber

Help sustain an independent traditional Catholic voice. Your paid subscription supports the writing and publication of Nuntiatoria and the Old Roman Apostolate.

If you value this ministry, please help keep it growing through regular support.

Become a supporting subscriber

Or subscribe free

Already a paid subscriber? Thank you for your support. If you currently subscribe free, please consider becoming a paid supporter.

NUNTIATORIA

Help keep Nuntiatoria freely available

If you value Nuntiatoria, please consider making a donation. Your gift helps meet the costs of producing and publishing its articles, maintaining this website and sustaining the ministry behind it.

Every contribution, however modest, is gratefully received. Thank you for your generosity and your prayers.

Donate via PayPal

You will be taken to PayPal to make your donation.