Fr James Martin on Holy Communion: Sin vs Scandal Explained

Fr James Martin, Holy Communion and the distinction between private sin and public scandal

Fr James Martin’s complaint that homosexual Catholics are treated “like dirt” when refused Holy Communion obscures essential distinctions in Catholic sacramental discipline. Homosexual inclination is not sinful conduct; a publicly contracted same-sex marriage does not establish that sexual activity is taking place; and no priest may presume the secrets of another person’s conscience. Yet a publicly maintained marital status contrary to Catholic doctrine presents a separate question of scandal which private continence does not necessarily resolve. The Church must neither condemn what she cannot know nor appear to recognise as marriage what she knows cannot be marriage.

Fr James Martin SJ has once again placed the Church’s sacramental discipline within the language of personal rejection. In an interview with JD Flynn for The Pillar Podcast, published on 12 October, the Jesuit described homosexual Catholics as sometimes being treated “like dirt”, including being told that they cannot receive Holy Communion. In an exchange circulated subsequently on social media, Flynn sought to distinguish rejection on account of homosexual identification from the consequences of publicly presenting oneself as married. Martin’s response referred instead to a priest knowing about someone’s homosexual conduct. The extract does not establish the circumstances of any particular refusal, still less prove that Martin rejects every application of Eucharistic discipline. It does, however, expose a serious theological confusion whenever being refused Communion is presented, without further distinction, as evidence of personal contempt.¹

The accusation is powerful precisely because genuine contempt is indefensible. A priest who humiliates a person because of homosexual attraction, indulges in insults or treats someone as morally inferior merely because of an inclination has failed in charity and justice. The Church has never authorised cruelty as an instrument of pastoral care. But it does not follow that every refusal of Holy Communion is cruel, or that every request to refrain from receiving constitutes discrimination. The right to respectful treatment is not a right to have one’s circumstances declared morally acceptable. Nor can pastoral sensitivity dispense with the obligations arising from the Real Presence of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament. Before anyone can reasonably judge a priest’s conduct, it is necessary to establish what he knows, what he has merely assumed, what the Church actually requires, and whether the matter belongs to the private conscience or to the public order of ecclesiastical life.

The distinction begins with homosexual inclination itself. The Church does not teach that the experience of same-sex attraction constitutes personal sin. A Catholic who experiences such attraction and lives chastely is subject to precisely the same fundamental conditions for worthy Communion as every other Catholic. His inclination does not render him spiritually inferior, place him outside the Mystical Body or create an additional sacramental impediment. The Catechism explicitly requires that persons experiencing homosexual attraction be received with respect, compassion and sensitivity, while also affirming their vocation to chastity. These are not contradictory demands. The dignity of the person and the moral obligations of Christian discipleship arise from the same understanding of man as created in the image of God and called to holiness.²

The next distinction concerns actual sexual conduct. The Church teaches that sexual acts outside marriage are gravely contrary to the moral law, whether committed by homosexual or heterosexual persons. Homosexual acts, fornication and adultery cannot be rendered morally good by affection, sincerity or the duration of a relationship. Yet the objective gravity of an act is not identical with the subjective culpability of the person committing it. Mortal sin requires grave matter, sufficient knowledge and deliberate consent. A Catholic conscious of grave sin is ordinarily obliged to seek sacramental reconciliation before approaching Holy Communion. This responsibility is expressed in canon 916, which addresses the communicant’s own disposition before God. It does not authorise the priest to invent sins, presume sexual conduct or claim knowledge of another person’s conscience.³

A homosexual couple may share a home without engaging in sexual relations. They may be longstanding companions, mutually dependent, or responsible for one another’s care. Even two persons who have contracted a civil same-sex marriage may not be maintaining a sexual relationship. They may be living in complete continence. It would therefore be unjust to assert that their sexual conduct is necessarily sinful merely because their relationship is publicly known. The priest who presumes otherwise commits an error of judgement before he has even reached the canonical question. Catholic moral theology does not permit accusations of actual wrongdoing to be substituted for evidence, however strongly the surrounding circumstances may invite speculation.

But this is precisely where another distinction becomes indispensable. A publicly contracted same-sex marriage presents a question which cannot be resolved simply by establishing whether sexual activity is taking place. Its significance is not confined to the private behaviour of the parties. Civil marriage is a public declaration that a particular relationship possesses marital status. It confers legal recognition upon that claim and ordinarily invites society to regard the persons concerned as spouses. Such a declaration carries an objective meaning independently of the private arrangements within the household. The Catholic objection therefore concerns not merely what the parties may be doing sexually, but what they publicly claim their relationship to be.

Marriage, according to Catholic doctrine, is not simply an affectionate or durable partnership recognised by civil authority. It is the union of man and woman established by the Creator, possessing an intrinsic orientation towards the good of the spouses and the generation and upbringing of children. Between baptised persons, valid marriage is also a sacrament. A same-sex partnership may involve genuine friendship, devotion, sacrifice and mutual assistance. None of these human goods should be denied merely because the relationship is irregular. Nevertheless, they cannot constitute a marriage in the sense received and taught by the Church. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith made this distinction explicit in its 2003 Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons. Respect for persons, however necessary, does not oblige the Church to recognise their relationship as something it cannot be.⁴

Thus the marriage register and the confessional answer different questions. The marriage register records a public juridical claim. The confessional concerns sins, repentance, absolution and the reconciliation of the soul with God. A public civil marriage cannot disclose whether the parties are sexually active, whether they have repented of particular sins or whether they are living chastely. But neither can a private commitment to continence necessarily remove the public significance of a relationship which continues to be presented as marriage. One fact concerns conduct and conscience; the other concerns an externally manifested condition and its relationship to Catholic doctrine.

This is where the traditional understanding of scandal becomes decisive. Scandal does not mean that somebody has taken offence, that a newspaper has expressed indignation or that a congregation has been embarrassed. In Catholic moral theology it means an attitude or behaviour which leads another towards evil, including by encouraging a false understanding of moral obligations. The Catechism describes scandal as an offence against charity because of the spiritual harm it can cause. A publicly maintained relationship contrary to the Church’s doctrine of marriage may therefore create scandal even where the parties themselves are personally sincere and even where sexual wrongdoing has not been established. The difficulty lies in the possibility that the public circumstances, especially when apparently affirmed by ecclesiastical practice, may mislead others concerning what the Church actually teaches.⁵

Yet scandal cannot be invoked as an incantation which instantly settles every disciplinary question. The mere existence of a public civil marriage does not dispense the Church from establishing the conditions required by canon law. Canon 915 concerns those who obstinately persevere in manifest grave sin. It does not authorise refusal of Communion simply because a minister personally disapproves of someone’s circumstances, suspects wrongdoing or anticipates criticism from others. The objective gravity of the situation, its persistence and its manifest character are juridically significant. These conditions must be applied properly, not asserted through prejudice or inferred automatically from sexual orientation. To protect the Sacrament by disregarding the law governing its administration would itself be a failure of ecclesiastical justice.

An important clarification was provided by the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts in its declaration of 24 June 2000. Addressing the application of canon 915 to divorced Catholics who had contracted subsequent civil marriages, the Council explained that manifest grave sin must be understood objectively, since the minister cannot judge subjective imputability. It also explained that obstinate perseverance does not necessarily require an openly defiant attitude or a prior formal warning. The persistence of an objectively grave situation is the relevant consideration. At the same time, the declaration expressly recognised that persons living in complete continence are not thereby persisting in habitual grave sexual sin merely because their civil marital status remains unchanged. It then introduced the indispensable qualification that, where continence is private but the irregular civil condition public, Communion may be received only remoto scandalo — with scandal removed.⁶

That last distinction is particularly illuminating. The Council did not demand that a priest assume sexual intercourse was taking place. Nor did it treat the private absence of sexual activity as automatically removing every difficulty created by the public relationship. Instead, it required the Church to attend to both realities. There may be no continuing sexual misconduct, yet a public appearance capable of misleading the faithful may remain. Equally, the existence of a civilly irregular union does not give the minister permission to disregard genuine repentance and continence. Pastoral judgement must be sufficiently careful to recognise each circumstance without confusing one with another.

The declaration was directed specifically towards divorced and civilly remarried Catholics. Its provisions must not simply be transferred mechanically to every person in a same-sex civil marriage. The situations are not canonically identical: a man and woman attempting a second marriage while an existing valid bond persists present one kind of contradiction; two persons of the same sex publicly claiming a marital union which the Church cannot recognise present another. The shared theological principle, however, is directly relevant. Private continence and public scandal are distinct considerations. The former concerns what the persons are actually doing; the latter concerns what their publicly maintained circumstances may communicate. Any application of canon 915 must respect that distinction while establishing its own necessary conditions.

St John Paul II had already articulated the underlying concern in Familiaris Consortio. His treatment of divorced and civilly remarried Catholics was not founded exclusively upon assumptions about sexual activity. He explained that their publicly maintained condition of life could objectively contradict the indissoluble union between Christ and His Church, signified and effected by the Eucharist, while their admission to Communion could lead the faithful into error concerning the Church’s doctrine of marriage. Nevertheless, where grave reasons prevented separation, he recognised the possibility of sacramental reconciliation through an undertaking to live in complete continence. The relationship between continence, public marital status and scandal was therefore already part of the Church’s carefully differentiated pastoral discipline.⁷

A related principle appears even in Fiducia Supplicans, the 2023 declaration whose permission for certain non-liturgical blessings of couples in irregular situations and same-sex couples provoked widespread controversy. Whatever difficulties attend that document and its reception, its explicit doctrinal premise is significant: ecclesiastical gestures must not create the impression that something which is not marriage is being recognised as marriage. If the public meaning of an irregular union matters even in deciding how a non-liturgical blessing may be given, it cannot simply be declared irrelevant when considering the Church’s wider sacramental witness. The theological point is one of consistency, not an assertion that the conditions for receiving a blessing and those for receiving Holy Communion are identical. They are not.⁸

The practical implications require judgement rather than theatrical severity. A priest confronted with a publicly irregular situation should seek the facts through appropriate private pastoral conversation. He must distinguish people sharing accommodation from those deliberately asserting a marital relationship, actual conduct from presumed conduct, and an ambiguous appearance from a publicly maintained doctrinal contradiction. He should explain the Church’s teaching, clarify what the parties themselves profess, and determine whether genuine scandal exists and how it may be removed. A public confrontation at the Communion rail should ordinarily be avoided through prior counsel. Nevertheless, where the conditions of canon 915 are established, the minister’s obligation cannot be set aside because fulfilling it may cause distress. The 2000 declaration specifically requires both firmness and extreme charity, neither of which can replace the other.⁹

This discipline must be applied without favouritism. A heterosexual Catholic openly maintaining an adulterous union cannot claim that the public character of his circumstances is irrelevant while a homosexual Catholic is subjected to special scrutiny. Conversely, a homosexual Catholic cannot properly be treated as manifestly guilty of sexual misconduct merely because two persons share accommodation or because their relationship attracts disapproval. The Church’s moral law is universal, and her sacramental discipline cannot be reduced to selective enforcement against those whom a particular priest, parish or generation regards unfavourably. The distinction between private sin and public scandal protects both the integrity of doctrine and the rights of the faithful.

Nuntiatoria has already examined the consequences of failing to maintain these distinctions. Its treatment of the public confirmation of Gio Benitez in New York raised the question of ecclesiastical responsibility when a publicly contracted same-sex civil marriage accompanies the administration of a sacrament. Its examination of the Synod’s Study Group 9 challenged the prominence given to testimonies favouring the recognition of same-sex relationships while Catholics embracing chastity according to traditional doctrine appeared largely absent from the discussion. More recently, its scrutiny of the anniversary Mass associated with Cardinal Timothy Radcliffe considered the even more explicit problem of a Eucharistic celebration organised around the public affirmation of a same-sex partnership. These controversies are not interchangeable; Confirmation, Eucharistic admission and the public purpose of a liturgical celebration engage different canonical questions. But they illuminate a common issue: whether ecclesiastical practice may appear to affirm a relationship which the Church’s doctrine does not recognise as marriage.¹⁰

The present controversy with Fr Martin allows the argument to be refined further. It is insufficient merely to point towards a publicly irregular relationship and assume that all the necessary canonical conclusions follow. Equally, it is insufficient to answer concerns about an irregular relationship by insisting that nobody can know what occurs privately between the parties. The first approach risks injustice by presumption; the second evades the public character of the circumstances. Sound sacramental discipline requires neither assumption. The relevant facts must be distinguished, the appropriate norms applied, and the pastoral consequences explained in accordance with the truth.

This bears directly upon Nuntiatoria‘s previous examination of the controversies surrounding Amoris Laetitia. In its consideration of Bishop Marian Eleganti’s criticism of contemporary synodal language, the publication identified the danger of allowing accompaniment, sensitivity and diminished subjective culpability to displace the objective categories by which sacramental circumstances are assessed. The Church has always recognised that culpability may be reduced by ignorance, weakness and other circumstances. But the inability to determine subjective guilt does not abolish the objective moral law, nor does it necessarily eliminate the ecclesial consequences of a public situation. The genuine development of pastoral care must preserve this distinction, not render it practically meaningless.¹¹

There is a particular injustice towards Catholics experiencing same-sex attraction who faithfully strive to live chastely when pastoral rhetoric implies that the Church’s moral requirements are themselves expressions of rejection. Their lives contradict the suggestion that homosexual attraction must necessarily result in homosexual conduct, or that obedience to Catholic teaching is possible only through repression, isolation or dishonesty. They may endure genuine loneliness, considerable sacrifices and misunderstanding from those who regard chastity as either unnecessary or unattainable. The Church owes them not a revised morality which makes their sacrifices appear futile, but the friendship, spiritual support, sacramental grace and clear teaching necessary to sustain their vocation. They are not exceptions to the Gospel’s demands. They are witnesses to their continuing possibility.

The greatest pastoral error is to confuse admission to Holy Communion with approval of the communicant’s entire life. The Eucharist is not reserved for those who have attained moral perfection. Every communicant approaches through grace, and no Christian can claim worthiness as a personal achievement. Nevertheless, the Church requires the proper disposition for reception because the Sacrament is not an ordinary religious meal. St Paul warned the Corinthians that whoever receives unworthily becomes guilty of the Body and Blood of the Lord and eats and drinks judgement upon himself. The Apostle’s concern was not social exclusion but the objective holiness of what was being received. The priest who encourages Communion contrary to the Sacrament’s requirements is not rendering the communicant a service. He risks becoming an accomplice to the very spiritual harm which sacramental discipline exists to prevent.¹²

This is also why the suggestion that priests enforcing legitimate discipline are treating people contemptuously must be challenged. Where there has been genuine humiliation, contempt or arbitrary exclusion, the criticism is deserved. But where a priest patiently explains the duty to refrain from unworthy Communion, or lawfully withholds the Sacrament in circumstances satisfying canon 915, he cannot justly be accused of mistreatment simply because the person concerned finds the decision painful. Painful truths may be communicated cruelly, but their painfulness does not itself make them cruel. To assert otherwise is to place the feelings generated by a pastoral decision above the moral and sacramental reasons which may require it.

Nor, however, may the opposite exaggeration be allowed to stand: that a priest demonstrates fidelity by refusing Communion whenever he suspects a person of sexual wrongdoing. He has no licence to investigate the intimate lives of parishioners upon the strength of gossip, personal hostility or preconceived assumptions. There is a necessary restraint in traditional Catholic discipline, precisely because the Church recognises the difference between what belongs to God alone and what is externally manifest. The confessional protects what the minister of Communion cannot publicly presume. Canon law protects what the public order of the Church cannot safely ignore.

The central question, then, is not whether a homosexual Catholic is sufficiently welcome. The Church’s concern for the dignity and salvation of every soul is not conditional upon sexual inclination. Nor is it whether a civil same-sex marriage proves sexual activity. It does not. The central question is whether a publicly maintained claim to marriage contrary to Catholic doctrine can create an objective scandal requiring pastoral resolution, and whether the resulting circumstances meet the conditions for sacramental restriction. That question must be answered through doctrine, evidence, canonical justice and charity, not through competing accusations of cruelty and prejudice.

The Church does not serve the individual by pretending that his public circumstances possess no moral or ecclesial meaning. Neither does she serve him by attributing sins which have not been established. Her obligation is to proclaim the truth about marriage, respect the hidden conscience, encourage repentance where it is needed, recognise chastity where it is practised, remove scandal where it exists, and protect the Blessed Sacrament from irreverence or misuse as a symbol of unconditional affirmation. Each obligation belongs to the same pastoral mission. None may be sacrificed merely because it complicates the preferred narrative.

A priest who knowingly administers Holy Communion in circumstances where the Church requires refusal fails in reverence towards Our Lord and charity towards the communicant. A priest who refuses Communion without sufficient grounds fails in justice towards the person before him. Both failures are grave because both involve duties arising from the same sacred office. The answer is not to abandon sacramental discipline, but to observe it accurately, consistently and without cruelty.

The marriage register is public; the conscience is not. A public claim to marriage cannot be made doctrinally true by private affection or even private continence. But neither can a public civil status disclose every sin, intention or spiritual disposition of those who possess it. The Church must judge what is manifest, refrain from presuming what is hidden, and administer the Eucharist according to the truth of what it is. Anything less fails either the soul before the altar or the Lord who is present upon it.