Caius College is requiring every undergraduate to attend ninety minutes of “inclusivity training” delivered by Stop Hate UK. The immediate questions concern legal accuracy, academic freedom and what students will actually be expected to affirm. The larger question is one Nuntiatoria has been documenting for some time: when did protecting people from unlawful discrimination become a licence for institutions to prescribe how lawful disagreement itself must be understood?

There is nothing objectionable about a university teaching students that racial abuse is wrong, that religiously motivated violence is serious, that disabled people must not be discriminated against, or that harassment can cause real harm. Students ought to understand the Equality Act, the criminal law and their obligations towards one another. A college which failed to protect students from genuine bullying, intimidation or unlawful discrimination would rightly be criticised.

That is precisely why the decision taken by Gonville & Caius College deserves scrutiny. In an email sent by its Education and Tutorial Office on 15 September, the College announced a series of ninety-minute “inclusivity training” sessions to be delivered by Stop Hate UK at the beginning of the academic year. Staff, Fellows and senior members are invited to attend; undergraduates are not invited but required. The sessions are to cover recognition of hate incidents, protected characteristics, “inclusive behaviours” and supporting students, with Caius saying that participation is important to ensure a “collective and unified response”. The Committee for Academic Freedom has since challenged both the legal accuracy of material published by Stop Hate UK and the implications of making such training compulsory.¹

The phrase “collective and unified response” is more revealing than it may first appear. A college should certainly have a common response to assault, intimidation, unlawful harassment and discrimination. Those are matters of conduct and law. But what exactly is the required unified response to a disputed account of sex, an objectionable opinion about religion, an alleged microaggression, a philosophical conviction about human nature, or an ambiguous gesture interpreted by somebody else as hostile? Universities exist in large part because intelligent people do not have unified answers to questions of that kind.

For that reason, this should not be treated as another isolated culture-war quarrel. Nuntiatoria has been following the same institutional development in different forms for more than a year: a gradual movement from regulating identifiable unlawful conduct towards regulating the language, perceptions, attitudes and interpretative categories through which lawful citizens understand one another. In “Government by Ambiguity: How Imprecision Became a Technique of Power”, we examined the administrative power carried by words such as “harm”, “hate”, “hostility”, “safety”, “misinformation” and “inclusion”. The difficulty begins when a precise question — what unlawful thing has this person actually done? — gives way to a much less precise one — what does this person’s speech or behaviour reveal about the kind of person we believe him to be?² The first regulates conduct; the second begins to regulate consciousness.

Caius offers an unusually clear test because the compulsory course expressly promises instruction concerning protected characteristics. If an outside organisation is commissioned to tell Cambridge undergraduates what the law protects, precision is not an optional refinement. Section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 identifies nine protected characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. “Gender identity” is not among them.³

Yet Stop Hate UK’s own published educational material has at times substituted the broader expression “gender identity” for the statutory characteristic of gender reassignment, while some material has also omitted age from lists presented as protected characteristics.⁴ ⁵ The Committee for Academic Freedom has drawn attention to precisely this discrepancy.¹ This is not pedantry. Parliament chose particular words and gave them defined legal meanings. “Gender reassignment” and “gender identity” are not interchangeable simply because campaigning organisations, employers or equality officers may habitually speak as though they were.

There is an important qualification which makes accurate teaching more necessary, not less. “Transgender identity” is one of the five centrally monitored hate-crime strands used by police and prosecutors.⁶ The hate-crime framework and the Equality Act therefore employ different terminology for different purposes. A competent training course should explain that distinction carefully. It should not leave students with the impression that language used in one legal or administrative context automatically creates a protected characteristic in another.

The distinction has acquired still greater importance since For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers. In April 2025 the Supreme Court unanimously held that “sex”, “woman” and “man” in the Equality Act bear their biological meaning. The Court was equally clear that transgender people remain protected against discrimination, including through the characteristic of gender reassignment.⁷ Those propositions coexist perfectly well. One does not have to misstate biological sex in order to protect transgender people, and one does not have to diminish the rights of transgender people in order to state accurately what the Equality Act means by sex.

The same is true of protected belief. Forstater v CGD Europe established that the gender-critical belief that biological sex is real, immutable and should not simply be conflated with gender identity is capable of protection as a philosophical belief under the Equality Act.⁸ That does not make every expression or manifestation of such a belief lawful; no protected belief enjoys that immunity. It does mean, however, that institutions cannot quietly proceed on the assumption that one side of the sex-and-gender argument represents “inclusion” while the other side’s legally protected convictions are themselves evidence of prejudice.

For Cambridge, this is not theoretical. Only six months ago Nuntiatoria published “Cambridge Corrected: Academic Freedom, Legal Reality, and the Quiet Collapse of Institutional Neutrality” after Cambridge colleges amended internal policies following intervention over recognition of gender-critical belief. We argued then that the deeper problem was the distance between formal legal protection and institutional culture: the law protected competing convictions, while sections of university culture had behaved as though one position were morally normative and dissent from it naturally suspect.⁹

Three months earlier, in “A Pub and a Principle: Ideology, Equality Law, and the Right to Public Life”, we examined the experience of Cambridge student Thea Sewell, founder of the Cambridge Society of Women. The principle at stake was broader than that particular dispute. A free society must preserve the distinction between belief and conduct. A person may hold convictions which others regard as offensive, foolish or even morally wrong while remaining entitled to ordinary civic participation. The law may restrain discriminatory acts, harassment and criminal behaviour. It does not establish a tribunal of fashionable opinion.¹⁰

That history makes the present decision by Caius particularly striking. Cambridge has already experienced bitter disagreements over whether women may organise on the basis of biological sex. Its colleges have already been forced to confront the protected status of gender-critical belief. Yet one of those colleges is now requiring every undergraduate to receive “inclusivity” instruction from an external organisation whose published educational material has itself blurred the distinction between gender identity and an actual statutory protected characteristic.

That does not establish what Stop Hate UK will say in the room. The sessions have not yet taken place, and it would be intellectually careless to accuse trainers in advance of statements they have not made. The proper question is therefore not whether Stop Hate UK has already coerced Caius students, but why Caius has made attendance compulsory without first demonstrating publicly that material touching upon law, sex, religion and expression will distinguish accurately between statute, judicial interpretation, campaigning vocabulary and contested social theory.

The same issue appears in Stop Hate UK’s treatment of “hate”. Its published catalogue has carried the slogan “Islamophobia is a crime”.⁵ Whatever the intention behind encouraging the reporting of anti-Muslim offences, that sentence is not an adequate description of English criminal law. There is no free-standing criminal offence called “Islamophobia”. Crimes motivated by hostility towards Muslims because of their religion may certainly qualify as hate crimes, and threatening conduct intended to stir up religious hatred may itself be criminal. Criticism, rejection, ridicule or dislike of Islam is not thereby an offence.

Parliament was sufficiently alive to that danger to enact an unusually explicit safeguard. Section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986 protects discussion and criticism of religions, together with expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse directed towards religions or their beliefs and practices.¹¹ The distinction is indispensable. Muslims are people possessing legal rights; Islam is a religion making truth claims which may be believed, rejected, examined or criticised. The same is true of Christianity. Protecting a Christian against religiously aggravated assault does not protect Christianity from ridicule, and protecting a Muslim against intimidation does not render hostile criticism of Islamic theology criminal.

Nuntiatoria addressed this directly in “Academic Freedom under Threat: Peers Warn Against Labour’s Proposed Islamophobia Definition”. Our concern was not opposition to protecting Muslims from genuine hatred or discrimination. It was the danger of collapsing hostility towards persons into hostility towards propositions, and then allowing an elastic campaigning expression to migrate from activism into university discipline, employment policy and public administration.¹² The Stop Hate UK slogan shows why that distinction matters. Campaigning shorthand may be designed to produce a response; compulsory university instruction which purports to teach students about law requires something more exact.

Nor should hate crime be confused with “hate”. The Crown Prosecution Service begins with a criminal offence and then asks whether qualifying hostility has been demonstrated or formed part of the motivation.⁶ The distinction is basic but increasingly necessary to restate: hateful thought is not itself a free-standing crime. A person may hold an ugly, prejudiced or irrational opinion without thereby having committed an offence. Liberal societies have historically understood that the criminal law governs acts meeting defined thresholds, not the silent contents of the human mind.

Stop Hate UK itself recognises the difference when it distinguishes hate crimes from the broader category of “hate incidents”.¹³ There is a legitimate reason for doing so. Apparently minor episodes can form part of a course of stalking, harassment or intimidation which becomes apparent only when incidents are considered together. No serious defence of free speech requires universities, police or employers to ignore patterns of genuinely threatening conduct. But recording an occurrence because it may contribute to a later pattern is not the same thing as proving that the occurrence itself was unlawful, nor does somebody’s sincere perception of hostility establish another person’s motive as a matter of fact.

That distinction mattered in “Christian Artist Reported to Police After Discussion on Gender at Watford Museum”, where we examined the practical consequences of allowing subjective perception to acquire administrative consequences in the absence of criminal wrongdoing.¹⁴ One of the lessons of the long controversy surrounding non-crime hate incidents is that prosecution is not necessary for an administrative system to chill speech. A person can still be reported, investigated, recorded, excluded or required to explain himself. The process itself can therefore alter behaviour even when no offence is eventually established.

This is why the categories through which students are trained to interpret one another deserve attention. Stop Hate UK’s published glossary includes “microaggressions” and the still broader category of “micro-inequities”, which may be conveyed through facial expressions, gestures, tone of voice and choice of words.⁴ Its educational materials are aimed at schools, colleges and universities and encourage participants to recognise and respond to conduct framed through those concepts.¹⁸ There is nothing improper about a university studying such ideas. Cambridge is precisely the sort of place where students should examine their origins, empirical foundations, methodological criticisms, usefulness and limitations.

The distinction which matters is between studying a theory and being trained through it. In a seminar, a student may be invited to consider whether an ambiguous remark or facial expression constitutes a microaggression, what evidence would justify that conclusion, whether intention matters and what alternative explanations might fit the facts. In compulsory behavioural training, the same concept can cease to be an object of inquiry and become instead the lens through which the student’s own attitudes and reactions are assessed. That is an entirely different intellectual relationship.

The same issue arose in “Compulsion at Open University Student Union”, where we drew the distinction between civility and compelled affirmation.¹⁵ Institutions may reasonably require courteous conduct. They may prohibit harassment and unlawful discrimination. They may establish clear rules governing access to university life. What they cannot simply assume is that treating another person with dignity requires assent to every proposition that person, an activist organisation or an equality department advances about human identity. Courtesy concerns conduct; assent belongs to conscience and intellect.

The Office for Students has now supplied Caius with an unusually pertinent test. Its freedom-of-speech guidance, updated in August 2026, distinguishes compulsory attendance from compelled agreement. A higher-education institution may require students to attend training which advances views with which some participants disagree. What it should not do is make completion depend upon the participant actively endorsing a viewpoint or value judgement. The OfS expressly identifies that as “compelled speech within training”.¹⁶

Mandatory attendance is therefore not, by itself, the decisive objection. The decisive question is what happens when a student disagrees. Can someone listen attentively and participate civilly while saying that he does not accept gender identity as an adequate account of human sex? Can a woman argue that a women’s association should organise on the basis of biological sex? Can a student challenge the empirical foundations of unconscious-bias theory or dispute whether a particular scenario constitutes a microaggression? Can a Muslim defend traditional Islamic teaching on sexual morality, a Catholic defend Catholic teaching, an atheist ridicule both religions, and another student disagree vigorously with all three? If the answer to such questions is yes, the College may be requiring attendance at a controversial course, but it has not necessarily compelled intellectual conformity.

The test becomes sharper still where the disagreement concerns the interpretation of an ambiguous incident. A student ought to be free to say that a remark was offensive but lawful, that another was hateful but not criminal, that severe criticism of Islam remained legitimate, that a facial expression had been misinterpreted, or that an alleged microaggression admitted of another explanation. If completion depends upon revising such answers until the approved formulation has been produced, then the activity has ceased to be education about inclusion and become formation into an orthodoxy.

That is also why Caius’s language of a “collective and unified response” is troubling. Unity concerning law is perfectly proper: nobody acquires a personal exemption from prohibitions on assault, harassment or discrimination merely because he describes his conduct as an exercise of conscience. Unity of interpretation is something else. A university which tells students what the law forbids is educating them; a university which decides in advance which contested theory must be used to interpret every ambiguous social encounter is assuming an altogether different role.

In “Prebunking Dissent: How Whitehall’s Misinformation Framework Could Turn Gender-Critical Speech into Wrongthink”, we examined a related mechanism.¹⁷ An argument does not have to be formally prohibited if an institution can first determine how its audience is expected to classify it. Label an opinion in advance as “misinformation”, “harm”, “hate” or prejudice and the speaker may retain the technical liberty to utter the words while the listener has already been instructed how the words are to be received. Formal censorship becomes unnecessary when the interpretative conclusion has been supplied beforehand.

Poorly designed inclusivity training can create the same problem in miniature. It need never tell a student, “You may not believe this.” It can instead teach him that the belief belongs within a settled category: harmful, exclusionary, phobic, prejudiced, unsafe, a microaggression or the product of unconscious bias. Sometimes that judgement will be correct. Real prejudice exists, real bullying exists, and people do sometimes use ambiguity as cover for cowardly or malicious behaviour. There are occasions when an “upstander” displays genuine moral courage by refusing to watch somebody else being targeted. The problem arises when categories designed to identify real misconduct are made so elastic that lawful disagreement begins to carry the same institutional stain.

Sometimes people simply disagree, and the achievement of genuine pluralism is not that disagreement disappears but that citizens acquire enough law, restraint and mutual tolerance to live together despite it. An authentically inclusive Cambridge college should be able to contain the transgender student, the gender-critical woman, the Muslim, the Catholic, the atheist, the progressive activist, the traditional moralist and the undergraduate who has given very little thought to any of these arguments at all. Each should be protected against unlawful mistreatment. None should possess an institutional right to compel the conscience of another.

That is inclusion in the serious sense, and it is considerably more demanding than putting everyone through the same ninety-minute session. We do not yet know what Stop Hate UK will actually require of Caius students, and that limitation should remain explicit. What is already known nevertheless justifies scrutiny: attendance is mandatory; the course concerns hate incidents and protected characteristics; Stop Hate UK’s published material has blurred or misstated some legal categories; its catalogue has used the sweeping slogan “Islamophobia is a crime”; its educational vocabulary includes disputed concepts such as microaggressions and micro-inequities; Caius itself speaks of securing a “collective and unified response”; and the higher-education regulator expressly warns against allowing mandatory training to become compelled assent.¹ ³ ⁴ ⁵ ¹⁶

None of this requires Caius to cancel the training. It requires the College to behave like a university. Every proposition presented as law should actually be law. The Equality Act’s protected characteristics should be distinguished from terminology used in hate-crime recording. The criminal protection of Muslims should be distinguished from protection of Islam against criticism. Concepts such as microaggressions and unconscious bias should be presented as ideas capable of examination rather than unquestionable facts about human interaction. Above all, Caius should make clear that participation in the session does not require ideological assent and that civil disagreement with a trainer cannot itself amount to failure to complete the course.

There is a familiar precedent for the need for such vigilance. Britain has already seen what has colloquially been described as “Stonewall law”: campaigning formulations entering HR departments, equality policies and institutional training until staff begin treating what an advocacy organisation believes the law ought to say as though Parliament or the courts had already said it.¹⁵ The lesson is not that universities should never take advice from campaigning organisations. It is that universities must remain intellectually sovereign when they do so. Expertise can be commissioned; institutional judgement should not be outsourced with it.

The best defence against prejudice is not inaccurate law, and the best defence against hatred is not confusion about what constitutes a crime. Minorities are not protected by conferring invented statutory authority upon contested concepts, and students are not prepared for genuine diversity by being trained to produce the same answers. Cambridge ought, of all places, to understand the difference between teaching students what they must think about and teaching them what they must think.

Ninety minutes is not the greatest imposition ever placed upon an undergraduate, but the principle exposed by those ninety minutes is much larger. A university worthy of the name does not manufacture a unified response to disputed ideas. It teaches its students enough law to know where liberty ends, enough charity to live peaceably with people who disagree, and enough intellectual courage to decide the rest for themselves.


¹ CAF intervenes over mandatory Cambridge “inclusivity training” — Committee for Academic Freedom, 1 October 2026.
² Government by Ambiguity: How Imprecision Became a Technique of Power — Nuntiatoria, 4 July 2026.
³ Equality Act 2010, Section 4: The Protected Characteristics — UK legislation.
⁴ Glossary of Terms — Stop Hate UK.
⁵ Catalogue 2025: September V.1 — Stop Hate UK.
⁶ Hate Crime — Crown Prosecution Service.
⁷ For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 — UK Supreme Court, 16 April 2025.
⁸ Forstater v CGD Europe and others — Employment Appeal Tribunal.
⁹ Cambridge Corrected: Academic Freedom, Legal Reality, and the Quiet Collapse of Institutional Neutrality — Nuntiatoria, 8 April 2026.
¹⁰ A Pub and a Principle: Ideology, Equality Law, and the Right to Public Life — Nuntiatoria, 28 January 2026.
¹¹ Public Order Act 1986, Section 29J: Protection of Freedom of Expression — UK legislation.
¹² Academic Freedom under Threat: Peers Warn Against Labour’s Proposed Islamophobia Definition — Nuntiatoria, 3 August 2025.
¹³ About Hate Crime — Stop Hate UK.
¹⁴ Christian Artist Reported to Police After Discussion on Gender at Watford Museum — Nuntiatoria, 17 April 2026.
¹⁵ Compulsion at Open University Student Union — Nuntiatoria, 2 December 2025.
¹⁶ Regulatory Advice 24: Guidance Related to Freedom of Speech — Office for Students, updated 5 August 2026.
¹⁷ Prebunking Dissent: How Whitehall’s Misinformation Framework Could Turn Gender-Critical Speech into Wrongthink — Nuntiatoria, 20 July 2026.
¹⁸ Training and Education for Educational Settings — Stop Hate UK.


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